

JOINT CRISIS COMMITTEE

(THE SIX DAY WAR between Israel and the Arab Nations of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq)

Background Guide



Welcome to the Shri Mun 2016!

Greetings Delegates,


In order to make things interesting and to offer a stimulating experience to the delegates of TSRS this year we thought of simulating a Joint Crisis Committee on the epic historic Six Day War of 1967 fought between Israel on one side and the Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi and Jordanian armed forces on the other. This simulation is divided into three parallel committees: the UN (Historical) Security Council, the Israeli Cabinet, and the Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian and Iraqi Council which will consist of Presidents and Generals of the four countries.

This committee is different from other committees as it consists of three different councils which represent three different set of interests with regard to the Six Day War discussing intense strategies while the war is going on. It is also a historic

committee and rather than just replaying past events, we will be looking to revise them and rewrite history. The Six Day War was an important development in Israel-Palestine relations that sealed the fates of Palestinian land the way it stands today and also established the hegemony of Israel in the area today. This provides delegates with a great opportunity to chart a new course in a conflicted relationship.

The committees have been convened on 5th June, 1967, just as the first shots of the war have been fired. Stepping back in time, into a excruciatingly tense and extremely volatile situation delegates will have a chance to create a lasting impact in a region where so far all efforts to create ever-lasting peace have failed. The precarious and sensitive politics of the region with its many intricacies make it impossible to see a clear end to the violent conflict and the imminent war promises to be bloody and destructive. The fate of the most conflicted region in the world lies in the hands of the delegates. It is up to you to decide whether you wish to repeat history or make an impact and change the face of world politics for good.

-Executive Board JCC, Shri MUN 2016



1. History of the Israel Palestine Issue

When the United Nations was founded on 24 October 1945, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, under a Mandate received in 1922 from the League of Nations, administered the territory of Palestine.

Among the issues that the Mandatory Power had to deal with, particularly after the end of the Second World War, was the question of a proposed Jewish home in Palestine. In November 1917, the British Government, in the so-called "Balfour Declaration", had declared itself in favor of "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people", on the understanding "that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine". Increasing Jewish immigration had been consistently opposed by the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, who in the mid-1940s comprised about two thirds of the territory's population of 2 million. Faced with escalating violence, the British Government decided, in February 1947, to bring the question of Palestine before the new United Nations.

Drawing attention to "the desirability of an early settlement in Palestine", Great Britain asked that, a special session of the General Assembly be called immediately in order to constitute and

instruct a special committee to prepare a preliminary study on the question of Palestine for consideration by the Assembly at its next regular session.

First Special Session of the General Assembly, 1947

At the first special session of the General Assembly, which began on 28 April 1947, five Arab countries — Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria — tried unsuccessfully to include in the agenda an item that would address “the termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence”. The Jewish Agency for Palestine presented the Jewish case, while the Arab Higher Committee spoke for the Palestinian Arabs.

Creation of UNSCOP

At the special session, the Assembly established the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), made up of 11 Member States, to investigate all questions relevant to the problem of Palestine and to recommend solutions to be considered by the General Assembly at its regular session in September 1947. During the course of a two-and-a-half-month investigation, the Special Committee went to Palestine and the neighboring countries of Lebanon, Syria and Trans-Jordan, and also visited displaced persons camps in Austria and Germany, which had been ravaged by the Second World War and had experienced the tragedy of the European Jews under Nazism. UNSCOP completed its work on 31 August 1947, with its members agreeing on the question of terminating the Mandate, the principle of independence and the role of the United Nations. There was no consensus, however, on a settlement of the question of Palestine. The committee considered two proposals on the question of Palestine: the majority and minority proposals. The majority of the members recommended that Palestine be partitioned into an Arab State and a Jewish State, with a special international status for the city of Jerusalem under the administrative authority of the United Nations. The three entities were to be linked in an economic union. The minority plan called for an independent federated structure comprising an Arab State and a Jewish State, with Jerusalem as the capital of the federation. Australia abstained from voting on either plan because it maintained that the recommendations exceeded the Committee’s terms of reference.

At its second regular session, after an intense two-month-long debate, the General Assembly, on 29 November 1947, adopted resolution 181 (II), approving with minor changes the Plan of Partition with Economic Union as proposed by the majority in the Special Committee on Palestine. The partition plan, a detailed four-part document attached to the resolution, provided for the termination of the Mandate, the progressive withdrawal of British armed forces and the delineation of boundaries between the two States and Jerusalem. The plan included:

1. The creation of the Arab and Jewish States, not later than 1 October 1948;

2. Division of Palestine into eight parts: three were allotted to the Arab State and three to the Jewish State, with the town of Jaffa forming an Arab enclave within Jewish territory, and
3. An international regime for Jerusalem, the eighth division, to be administered by the United Nations Trusteeship Council.

The plan also set out the steps to be taken prior to independence. It dealt with the questions of citizenship, transit, the economic union and a declaration to be made by the provisional government of each proposed State regarding access to holy places and religious and minority rights. By resolution 181 (II), the Assembly also set up the United Nations Palestine Commission to carry out its recommendations and requested the Security Council to take the necessary measures to implement the plan of partition.

The Jewish Agency accepted the resolution despite its dissatisfaction over such matters as Jewish emigration from Europe and the territorial limits set on the proposed Jewish State. The plan was not accepted by the Palestinian Arabs and Arab States on the ground that it violated the provisions of the United Nations Charter, which granted people the right to decide their own destiny. They said that the Assembly had endorsed the plan under circumstances unworthy of the United Nations and that the Arabs of Palestine would oppose any scheme that provided for the dissection, segregation or partition of their country, or which gave special and preferential rights and status to a minority.

End of the British Mandate

The adoption of resolution 181 (II) was followed by outbreaks of violence in Palestine. As the situation deteriorated, the Security Council called for a special session of the General Assembly, which then met from 16 April to 14 May 1948. On 17 April, the Security Council called for the cessation of all military and paramilitary activities in Palestine, and on 23 April it established a Truce Commission to supervise and help bring about a ceasefire. For its part, the General Assembly relieved the Palestine Commission of its responsibilities and decided to appoint a mediator charged with promoting a peaceful settlement in cooperation with the Truce Commission. On 20 May, Count Folke Bernadotte, President of the Swedish Red Cross, was chosen as United Nations Mediator.

The First Arab-Israeli War, 1948-1949



Israeli soldiers in the First Arab-Israeli War

On 14 May 1948, Britain relinquished its Mandate over Palestine and disengaged its forces. On the same day, the Jewish Agency proclaimed the establishment of the State of Israel on the territory allotted to it by the partition plan. Fierce hostilities immediately broke out between the Arab and Jewish communities. The next day, regular troops of the neighbouring Arab States entered the territory to assist the Palestinian Arabs.

The fighting was halted after several weeks, under a four-week truce called for by the Security Council on 29 May 1948. The truce went into effect on 11 June and was supervised by the United Nations Mediator with the assistance of a group of international military observers, which came to be known as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Despite the efforts of the Mediator, no agreement could be reached on an extension of the truce, and fighting broke out again on 8 July.

On 15 July 1948, the Security Council decided in a resolution that the situation in Palestine constituted a threat to the peace. It ordered a ceasefire and declared that failure to comply would be construed as a breach of the peace requiring immediate consideration of enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. In accordance with the resolution, a second truce came into force. By that time, Israel controlled much of the territory allotted to the Arab State by the partition resolution, including the western part of Jerusalem. Egypt and Jordan respectively controlled the remaining portions of the Gaza district and the West Bank of the Jordan River (which included East Jerusalem, with its walled Old City). More

fighting took place in October 1948 and March 1949, during which Israel took over other areas, some of which had been allotted to the Arab State. In 1950, Jordan brought the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, formally under its jurisdiction pending a solution to the problem.

General Assembly Resolution 194(III): The Right to Return

At its third regular session, on 11 December 1948, the General Assembly adopted resolution 194 (III), in which it delineated ways to resolve the Palestine problem. Following suggestions contained in the report prepared by Count Bernadotte for a solution to the increasingly intractable situation in Palestine, the Assembly declared that:

1. Refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date;
2. Compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return.

The Assembly also called for the demilitarization and internationalization of Jerusalem and for the protection of, and free access to, the holy places in Palestine. Resolution 194 (III) also provided for the establishment of a three-member United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, which was to assume the functions of the United Nations Mediator insofar as it was considered necessary. It was instructed to assist the parties in achieving a final settlement on all outstanding questions and to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees. The Assembly subsequently elected France, Turkey and the United States to comprise the Conciliation Commission.

On 11 May 1949, Israel became a Member of the United Nations. In admitting Israel, the General Assembly specifically took note of Israel's declarations and explanations made earlier to the Assembly's Ad Hoc Political Committee regarding the implementation of resolutions 181 (II) and 194 (III). Those declarations and explanations referred, among other things, to the international regime envisaged for Jerusalem, the problem of Arab refugees and boundary questions.

With the question of Palestine unresolved, an insecure peace, punctuated by violence and acts of force, was maintained in the region from 1950 until 1967, when Israel came to occupy the entire area of the former British Mandate of Palestine.

Establishment of UNEF I

Armed conflict erupted anew in the Middle East on 29 October 1956, when Israel began military operations against Egypt – to be joined later by France and the United Kingdom. Amidst sharply rising tensions, Egypt had nationalized the Suez Canal in July of that year.

At an emergency special session, the General Assembly called for a ceasefire, and the crisis ended with the eventual withdrawal of the invading forces and the deployment of the United

Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)—the first United Nations peacekeeping force. UNEF I was withdrawn in May 1967.

2. Present Situation

In the spring of 1967, tensions between Syria and Israel ran high, with flashpoints including terrorist raids against Israel originating from Syria and the Syrian diversion of water from the Jordan River. Following an attack on the water pump at Kibbutz Misgav Am, Israeli Prime Minister and Defense Minister Levi Eshkol resolved that after the next act of belligerence, Israel would position armored tractors deep into the demilitarized zones, wait to be hit, and then fire back. The plan went into effect accordingly and resulted in a large-scale dogfight on April 7 over Syrian skies, in which the Israeli Air Force shot down several Syrian planes. In the next month, Fatah, the Palestinian terrorist organization, launched more than a dozen attacks on Israel and planted mines and explosives on Israel's borders with Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. On May 5, violence escalated as Palestinian fighters shelled Kibbutz Manara. All the while, Israel continued with its forays into the demilitarized zones and Israel launched a diplomatic campaign to set the groundwork for retaliation.

An Israeli appeal to United Nations Secretary General U Thant led to unprecedented UN censure of the Arabs. On May 11, U Thant condemned the Arab attacks; but a proposed Security Council debate on the matter was derailed by Soviet obstructionism. The United States, meanwhile, refused Israel's request for tanks and jets and suggested that its naval fleet in the region would remain neutral in case of war. Israeli statements about answering Syrian aggression were reported in the international press and goaded additional Syrian backing of Fatah operations.

Soviet Meddling

In mid-May, Soviet meddling severely escalated the brewing conflict. On May 15, Israel Independence Day, plans for a parade involving large numbers of Israeli troops in western Jerusalem drew outrage in Arab countries. Wishing to defuse the situation, Eshkol forbade bringing heavy weapons into the capital. This decision was used by the Soviets to stoke tensions; on May 15, Anwar al-Sadat, then speaker of the National Assembly, visited Moscow, where he was warned (falsely) by the Soviets that Israel was planning to invade Syria sometime between the dates of May 16 and May 22. The Soviets cited the absence of weapons in the Jerusalem parade as proof that the Israelis were preparing for war and falsely claimed that Israel was massing brigades along its northern border with Syria. Syria also quickly passed the disinformation to Egypt's President Nasser, who on May 14 declared a state of emergency and made a show of parading his troops through Cairo on

their way to Sinai. During this period, Arab leaders and the media spoke daily of eliminating Israel.

Claims of Israeli Troop Buildup Debunked, But Evidence Ignored

On May 14, Gen. Muhammad Fawzi, the Egyptian chief of the general staff, visited Damascus and toured the Syrian border with Israel, where he saw no Israeli troop buildup. Fawzi's findings, which were confirmed by the chief of Egypt's military intelligence, the U.S. embassy in Cairo, and the CIA, were shared with Nasser, who nevertheless decided to proceed in his menacing troop buildups.

In response to the Egyptian troop buildup, Eshkol put the army on a first-level alert and authorized the placement of several tank companies in the south. Reluctant to send a message that Israel was eager for war, he did not call up the reservists. Israeli diplomats went into service on all fronts — inviting UN Observer Odd Bull to the north to confirm troops were not gathered there, seeking to relay to Egypt that Israel was not interested in war, and sending international warnings about the gravity of Egypt's actions.

Between the nights of May 15 and 16, the Egyptian and Palestinian troop presence in the Sinai tripled. On May 17, Egyptian planes entered Israeli airspace to carry out an unprecedented reconnaissance of Israel's nuclear reactor in Dimona, prompting the Israelis to heighten the alert of their army and airforce. Syria announced that its forces were deployed in the Golan Heights. Israeli Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin called up 18,000 troops and ordered the laying of mines along parts of the Egyptian border. General Murtagi, the Egyptian Commander of forces in the Sinai, declared an Order of the Day, which was broadcasted on Cairo Radio May 18: "The Egyptian forces have taken up positions in accordance with our predetermined plans. The morale of our armed forces is very high, for this is the day they have so long been waiting for, for this holy war."

Egypt Evicts UN Forces

In the evening of May 16, Egypt presented the United Nations Emergency Force, which had been deployed in the Sinai peninsula and Gaza Strip to discourage hostilities between Egypt and Israel, with a demand to withdraw from key locations. Without consulting with the General Assembly, as required by a commitment made in the UN in 1957, UN Secretary General U Thant decided to withdraw all of the UN forces. By May 19, UNEF officers relinquished their posts to the Egyptians and the Palestine Liberation Army.

The Americans again rebuffed Israeli diplomatic appeals, refusing to approve any preemptive actions, provide assurances regarding Israeli security or transfer tanks and jets

Israel had requested. Efforts to obtain from France and the United Kingdom expressions of support for Israel's security similarly failed. By May 20, Israel had called up 80,000 reservists.

Straits of Tiran Closed

On May 22, Egypt blocked the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping for the first time since the 1956 war, an act of war under international law. (Israel had long made clear that blocking the Israeli port of Eilat was cause for war.) Nasser's decision to close the strait set off activity across the Arab world. Lebanon, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia all activated their militaries. Iraqi troops reportedly approached the Syrian and Jordanian borders while Jordan moved tanks towards the West Bank.

U.S. Rejects Israeli Appeals

Up north, the Syrians blocked UN observers from reaching a critical road and began pouring troops into Golan Heights. At that point, the Israelis received a message from President Lyndon Johnson stating that they should not initiate fire or take any action without first consulting with the United States. Eshkol therefore argued against entering into war at that time, and on May 23 the government agreed to accept an American proposal in which the U.S. would weigh the possibility a multinational escort of Israeli ships through Tiran. (In the wake of the 1956 war, the United States had committed itself to guaranteeing Israel's access to the Straits of Tiran.) That night, Chief of Staff Rabin, suffering from anxiety, pressure, exhaustion, depression and perhaps nicotine poisoning, secretly withdrew from his duties for a two day period. His operations chief, Ezer Weizman, filled in for him and expanded upon Rabin's limited war plan with a more aggressive plan called Operation Axe.

However, Eshkol did not approve the operation, as foreign minister Abba Eban was in the middle of what proved to be an unsuccessful diplomatic campaign in France, Britain and the United States, where he asked for an American commitment that any attack on Israel would be equivalent to an attack on the U.S. Although Johnson had condemned the blocking of Tiran as "illegal" and "potentially disastrous to the cause of peace," and sent word to Egypt that its aggression would meet "gravest international consequences," he nevertheless held firm in his opposition to unilateral Israeli action. The French and Soviets also warned Israel against starting a war.

Operation Dawn

Egyptian Field Marshal Abd al-Hakim Amer, a onetime close confidant of Nasser whose growing power eventually came to threaten the president, was largely able to wrest

control of the country's armed forces from the Supreme Headquarters. He developed a war plan, called "Dawn," whose goal — capturing the whole Negev desert — far exceeded the more limited plan to isolate Eilat and bomb specified targets. Nasser didn't intervene with Amer's orders, despite the fact that they wrought chaos among the poorly-equipped troops pouring into Sinai, and contradicted Egypt's longstanding three-pronged defense strategy, dubbed "Conqueror."

In a tense meeting of Israeli leadership, Eshkol agreed to call up the remaining reservists, though he and Rabin again decided against going to war in favor of waiting for positive results to Eban's ongoing diplomacy trip. In France, Eban received a stern warning from Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle to refrain from attacking Egypt. Britain's response was less hostile and included promises to try to bring an end to the blockade.

The American Role

Starting on May 24, the U.S., for its part, attempted to sell the Israelis on the "Regatta" plan, which involved an international convoy affirming free passage through the Straits of Tiran. Within two days, international enthusiasm for the plan waned, but the Americans withheld this discouraging information from the Israelis.

ESHKOL EXPLAINS DELAYS BY ISRAEL

Says Johnson Twice Sought Time for Diplomatic Action

TEL AVIV, June 9 (UPI)—Premier Levi Eshkol said tonight that President Johnson had "promised great things" but that, in the end, Israel stood virtually alone against the Arab world.

In a speech to officials of his party, Mapai, Mr. Eshkol said "We were first asked to wait

A headline in the June 10, 1967 *New York Times* refers to pre-war delays to allow for diplomatic activity.

Furthermore, the plan to ensure free passage seemed irrelevant by May 25, when Eban, then in Washington, received a cable from Jerusalem emphasizing that Israel faced an

existential danger. "An all-out Egyptian-Syrian attack is imminent and could occur at any moment," it read. Eban, however, at times downplayed the Egyptian threat in discussions with American statesmen, much to the consternation of his colleagues in Israel. Perhaps soothed by Eban, Washington initially stalled on providing any direct guarantees or commitments, and continued to promise progress regarding an international convoy. Johnson appears to have hoped that, by stringing the Israelis along, he could buy time to either solve the situation via the United Nations or possibly convince the Israelis to agree to the placement of UNEF on their territory, an unthinkable option to Israel. On May 26, Eban met with Johnson, who said the U.S. "will support a plan to use any or all measures to open the straits." At the same time, Johnson continued to warn against Israel taking preemptive action.


Eban returned to Israel and joined a strongly polarized Cabinet debate about whether or not to strike preemptively. During the meeting, communications from Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk reiterated the American commitment to opening the Straits as well as U.S. opposition to an Israeli attack. The Israelis decided to keep their army mobilized but to hold off on war so as to give the Americans an opportunity to work their diplomacy.

The strain on the Israeli leadership was tremendous. A May 28 radio address, in which an exhausted Eshkol bumbled through a speech about the choice to rely on American diplomacy, left the nation in a state of panic. The army had been biding time until Eban's return, developing various contingency plans, but keeping everything on hold, resulting in confused troop movements in the Negev desert. Concerned about the deteriorating situation, army commanders were furious at the government's decision to withhold from war. The public responded similarly, expressing impatience for formation of a national unity government and preparing itself for war.

The Soviet Position

In Moscow, the Egyptians sought to clarify the Soviet position in case of war, and like the Israelis vis-a-vis the United States, received an ambiguous response. The Soviet ambassador in Cairo informed Nasser about a cable sent from Washington containing a warning of an imminent Egyptian attack and urged Nasser not to strike. As a result, Operation Dawn was called off. Although some in the Soviet Union had urged caution, Shams Badran, the Egyptian defense minister, returned from Moscow with the message that the Soviets would stand by the Egyptians in battle.

The Defense Pact



Arab troops mass on Israel's borders. (Click to enlarge.)
Source: *Martin Gilbert, Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*)

On May 30, King Hussein of Jordan and Nasser signed a mutual defense pact in which Egypt gained joint command of the Jordanian army. Iraq joined a military alliance with Syria, Egypt and Jordan. In the context of the pact, Jordan permitted the reopening of PLO offices in Amman and essentially relinquished control of its army to the Egyptians, who transferred two Egyptian battalions to Jordanian territory. By this point, Israel was surrounded by some 500,000 troops, more than 5,000 tanks, and almost 1,000 fighter planes.

Alarmed by this development and succumbing to public pressure, Eshkol stepped down as defense minister on June 1 and named popular war hero Moshe Dayan as a replacement, which buoyed public spirit. Eshkol also formed a national unity government, appointing Menachem Begin minister without portfolio.

In the first several of days of June, the Israeli government began to receive signals from the Americans that the U.S. no longer opposed a preemptive strike, and Dayan oversaw

final preparations of Israel's war plan.

Arab Preparations

As for the Egyptians, their troops continued to pour into Sinai. Despite some disorganization, shortages and exhaustion among his forces, Nasser was sure of victory. On the Jordanian front, battalions from the Arab Legion, under the control of Egyptian General 'Abd al-Mun'im Riyad, were largely spread out across West Bank Palestinian villages instead of being concentrated in more strategically important locales. Confident of victory, the Jordanians resolved to cut off western Jerusalem by attacking Israeli positions in the north and south of the city at the start of the fighting. As for Syria, it failed to coordinate with Egypt despite their defense pact. Like the Jordanians, the Syrians adopted ambitious war plans, opting for an offensive operation as opposed to a more limited plan to fend off Israeli attacks on the Golan Heights. Morocco, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia all sent troops to the Sinai. With the Arab nations united like never before, Arab oil companies pledged to boycott any country that supported Israel and Nasser threatened to close the Suez Canal. The Soviets, too, lent a hand of support by way of 10 warships which arrived in the eastern Mediterranean.

Israel Decides

In addition, Israel received word from France, the nation's major arms supplier, that De Gaulle had issued a complete ban on weapons sales and transfers to Israel. And in a June 4 meeting, the newly formed Cabinet, received a cable from President Johnson seeming to contradict the earlier American softening on the issue of preemption. It warned that "Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go it alone." Nevertheless, the Cabinet, in a 12-to-2 vote, opted for war, scheduled to begin early the next morning, Monday, June 5.

3. Timeline

1955 - 241 Israelis killed by Palestinian terrorists originating from Egyptian territory and 37

Israelis killed by terrorists originating from Jordanian territory.

Oct. 29, 1956 - The infamous Suez Crisis: Israeli leadership grows increasingly weary of aggression from the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip as well as Egypt's attempts to block Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal. Egyptian President Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956. Britain, which owns nearly half of the Suez Canal Company, seeks to prevent the nationalization by joining with France and Israel. Israel attacks the Sinai Peninsula, which in turn allowed Britain and France to condemn the fighting and demand that both sides withdraw from the region. The United States calls for a ceasefire in November 1956. A UN peacekeeping force occupies the area in March 1957 and reopens the canal on April 24, 1957.

Nov 18, 1959 - Israel begins work on the National Water Carrier Project, taking its share of Jordanian water in accordance with American President Johnson's plan.

Jan 13-17 1964 - Arab (Egypt, Syria, Jordan) heads of state meet in Cairo to counter Israel's national water carrier project. Arabs declare their intentions of stopping the Israeli diversion scheme, and a Unified Arab force under Egyptian command is created.

May 1964 - PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) founded with the aim of destroying Israel. The Palestinian National Charter (1968) officially called for the destruction and liquidation of Israel.

June 5, 1964 - Israel begins pumping water from the Sea of Galilee. Israel vehemently declares to take only its share of water allotted under the Johnston plan, with the implicit agreement of Jordan.

Sept 13, 1964 - Second Arab Summit decides on diversion of the headwaters of the Jordan as well as the strengthening of regional Arab armies. Arabs declare the aim of destroying Israel. Israel responds by addressing two notes to the UNSC, declaring their anxiety.

Jan. 2, 1965 - Al Fatah (Palestinian terrorist group) carries out first sabotage in Israel against the Israeli water project.

1965 - Syrian water diversion project begins as Syrians fire on Israeli demilitarized zones. Israel retaliates and bombards earth-moving equipment of the diversion project.

Sept. 18. 1965 - Third Arab Summit at Casablanca. Arab League agrees on plan to combat Israel, first building up armed forces in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon over the next 3 years, then proceeding to war.

Nov 13, 1965 - After Syria fires on Israeli patrol, the IAF bombs Syrian diversion project in retaliation. Four Israelis killed, 100+ dead Syrians.

Feb. 23, 1966 - New Syrian Baathist regime sets destruction of Israel as primary goal. Nov 9, 1966 – Egypt and Syria sign defense treaty, promising that Egypt would attack Israel in the south if Israel attacked Syria.

Nov 10, 1966 - Three Israeli soldiers are killed by a land mine on an Israeli patrol road near the border. King Hussein sends an apology via US Ambassador Walworth Barbour, but Barbour fails to deliver the apology.

Nov 13, 1966 - Israeli troops take action to prevent further attacks from Palestinians in West Bank and Jordan. The operation called for minimal strikes against Palestinian villages in Samu, but Israeli forces unexpectedly encounter Jordanian soldiers, killing 15. UN Security Council Resolution 228 censures Israel, but Jordan does not respond militarily. Palestinians living in West Bank and Jordan are outraged and clash with Jordanian security forces throughout West Bank.

Dec 14, 1966 - Egyptian Marshal Hakim Amer cables Nasser from Pakistan, in recommending the closing the straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping and dismissing the UN Peacekeeping (UNEF) force from Gaza.

Jan - March 1967 - Close to 300 “border incidents” occur, increasing tension in the area. April 7, 1967 - Israelis respond to intensive Syrian shelling of demilitarized zones and Israeli villages with IAF attack.

May 11, 1967 - Israeli PM Eshkol states, "In view of the 14 incidents in the past month alone it is possible that we will have to adopt measures no less drastic than those of April 7." The incidents included shelling, terror attacks and attempted infiltration of a Syrian agent to blow up locations in Jerusalem.

May 14, 1967 - First reports of Egyptian troop movements into Sinai.

May 18, 1967 - Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser orders the United Nations Peacekeeping Emergency Force to leave Sinai and surrounding regions.

May 23, 1967 - Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser closes the straits of Tiran to Israeli shipments. Egypt moves approximately 130,000 soldiers into Sinai. Negotiations with US to reopen the Straits of Tiran fail.

May 27, 1967 - Nasser cancels a planned Egyptian attack on Israel (Operation Fair Dawn), planned for following day, after it became obvious that the Israelis knew about the plan.

May 28, 1967 - Israeli Levi Eshkol broadcasts a hesitant, stammering speech, further exacerbating pressure on him to make way for other leaders. Later it is claimed that the stammering was due to problems in reading the manuscript.

May 30, 1967 - Jordan signs a defense pact with Egypt, allows Egyptian command of Jordan Legion.

May 31, 1967 - President Abdur Rahman Aref of Iraq states "The existence of Israel is an error which must be rectified. This is our opportunity to wipe out the ignominy, which has been with us since 1948. Our goal is clear - to wipe Israel off the map.

Jun 2, 1967 - Moshe Dayan joins Israeli cabinet as Minister of Defense. Coalition government formed. Reservists released for furlough before outbreak of the war.

4. Bloc Positions

Israel

As war looms on the horizon, Israel's demographic and geographic inferiority have become painfully apparent. Its landmass comprised less than a tenth of a percent of the total area of the Middle East, and its population less than two percent. Its citizens live under the constant threat of an Arab attack, a threat that has only been exacerbated by recent troop buildup on its borders. In addition, the recent closure of the Straits of Tiran put not only the economy of Israel, but the wellbeing of its people, at risk. At this time, the bellicose rhetoric from Arab leaders directed against Israel is pushing Israel closer and

closer to war. It waits now for the support of the Western nations, but it is unclear whether or not they will receive it.



Israeli War Cabinet

Western Bloc

At this time, Israel is not receiving the same special attention it had been in the past from the Western Bloc. As Israel prepares for a war on its home front, the United States is already embroiled in a major foreign war in Vietnam, and is hesitant to engage on another conflict. Instead, the United States, under the helm of the Johnson administration, aggressively pursues diplomatic solutions to the problem, including an attempt to organize a flotilla against the Egyptian blockade. Although France has historically been Israel's key supplier of weapons, relations have cooled since Charles de Gaulle's election in 1958. De Gaulle believed that a shift in policy favouring alignment with the Arabs would help reassert France as a world power independent from the American or Soviet camps. Prior to the Six Day War, Britain perceived Israel as a source of stability in the Middle East, where it held most of its oil interests. For this reason, the United Kingdom was willing to provide arms to Israel to defend itself. However, following the Suez Crisis of 1956, Britain saw its influence as a world power diminishing. Either an Israeli or Egyptian victory would spell danger for Britain, with an Israeli victory exacerbating the already dwindling British influence in the region, or an Egyptian victory leading to the fall of Western supported regimes, threatening the supply of oil.

Arab Bloc

The Arab bloc consists of the belligerents, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, as well as all the other Arab states that came to their aid at the outbreak of war. The Arab world was elated when Nasser moved to confront Israel, and cheerfully awaited what was expected to be an Israeli defeat. Some nations, such as Iraq, Lebanon, Algeria, and Pakistan even donated troops and logistics support for Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.



General Nasser of Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan sign the defense treaty

The Soviet Union

Initially supportive of the creation of Israel in 1949, the Soviet Union no longer regards the Zionist state as useful for extending its influence into the Middle East. Instead, it has now shifted its support to the Arab side in the form of training and weaponry, bringing the larger context of the Cold War into the Middle East. The Soviet Union played a key role in instigating the war, rousing suspicion of Israel within Arab leaderships, culminating in the report of Israeli troops amassed along the border.

General References

1. *Soldier of Peace: The Life of Yitzhak Rabin*, Dan Kurzman, 1998
2. *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East*, Michael B. Oren, 2002
3. *Israel: The Embattled Ally*, Nadav Safran, 1981

Sources:

1. <http://www.sixdaywar.org/precursors.asp>
2. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/arab-israeli-war-1967>
3. <https://vmun.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/BGS/HSC.pdf>

Looking forward to seeing you at the conference

Warm Regards,

Aniket Mookerjee	Milind Singh	Advaye Sawhney	Neel Dayal
Chairperson	Director	Chairperson	Director
JCC-Israel Cabinet		JCC-Egyptian, Jordanian, Iraqi and Syrian Cabinets	

Raghav Mathur	Saanchi Bhatia
Chairperson	Director
JCC-Historic Security Council	